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Abstract: Organised medicine in a number of advanced industrial
countries resisted the post-war trend toward more state involvement in
the funding and organisation of medical care. While there were eight
doctors’ strikes during the peak of reform efforts in the 1960s, two of
the most prolonged and bitter struggles took place in Canada and Bel-
gium. This comparative analysis of the two strikes highlights the philo-
sophy, motives, and strategies of organised medicine in resisting state-
led reform efforts. Although historical and institutional contexts in the
two countries differed, organised medicine in Canada and Belgium
thought and responded in very similar ways to the perceived threat of
medical insurance reform. While the perception of who won and who
lost the respective doctors’ strikes differed, the ultimate impact on the
trajectory of public healthcare on the medical profession was remark-
ably similar. In both countries, the strike would have a long-standing
impact on future reform efforts, particularly efforts to reform physician
remuneration in order to facilitate more effective primary healthcare.
Keywords: Doctors’ Strike; Canada; Belgium; Saskatchewan; 1960s;
Organised Medicine; Fee-for-Service; Medical Liberalism; Edmond
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Introduction
In the post-war era, there was a pronounced trend towards state intervention in the estab-
lishment of universal public healthcare systems in market-based advanced industrial
countries. This movement was particularly marked in Western Europe, but was also evi-
dent in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, organised medicine often
opposed this development, worrying that its closer proximity to the state through changes
 Gregory P. Marchildon and Klaartje Schrijvers,
2011.
*Gregory P. Marchildon, Canada Research Chair in
Public Policy and Economic History, Johnson-
Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, Univer-
sity of Regina, 110–12 Research Drive, Regina,
Saskatchewan, Canada S4S 0A2. Corresponding
author. Email: greg.marchildon@uregina.ca
Klaartje Schrijvers, Professor in Political History at
the RITS (Film and Dramaschool Brussels), Inde-
pendent Artist and Researcher, 21 Avenue Jean
Volders, 1060 Brussels, Belgium
203in payment systems might, over time, reduce physician income and diminish professional
autonomy. Between 1960 and 1968, there were a total of eight doctors’ strikes in
response to the state’s increased role in healthcare.
1 Two of the most sustained and threa-
tening strikes occurred in Canada and Belgium. In 1962, Canadian doctors organised a
twenty-three-day strike, while two years later, Belgian doctors launched an eighteen-
day strike. In both countries, these strikes re-shaped the subsequent design of universal
healthcare, preserving the centrality of a fee-for-service contractual model of physician
engagement with patients and the state as opposed to a salaried-employment model.
A comparative analysis of the Canadian and Belgian strikes elucidates some of the
common elements of these more extreme cases of physician resistance to collectively
funded and administered healthcare.
2 These included a commitment to what we call
‘medical liberalism’, an individualistic philosophy that was opposed to at least some of
the more collectivist assumptions underpinning governing parties that were expanding
the welfare state. Drawing from the Canadian and Belgian cases, this medical liberalism
was characterised by doctor–patient confidentiality, free choice of doctor by the patient,
non-interference by state administrators in a doctor’s individual clinical judgment, and
fees set by individual doctors (as opposed to the state) in order to preserve the privacy
and privileged nature of the doctor–patient relationship.
To protect their interests, physicians established new organisations, or refashioned
existing organisations, into ‘trade unions’ capable of opposing governments through col-
lective action including the credible threat of strike. Disciplined in their public messa-
ging, these new organisations were also prepared to punish non-compliant physicians
in order to ensure solidarity. In summary, they came to perform an overtly political func-
tion that differed substantially from the existing self-regulatory bodies focused on the
licensing, insuring, and disciplining of members for not meeting professional standards
of care and conduct. For physicians, the moral dilemma of whether a strike was consis-
tent with their oaths to provide needed medical care to all patients was ever-present, and
explains in part why physician strikes have been the exception rather than the rule in all
countries.
3 Finally, the fact that such collective action also went against the grain of the
individualistic underpinning of medical liberalism, also explains the challenge faced by
doctors in initiating and sustaining a strike.
Comparing movements or phenomena across countries, particularly when drawing les-
sons from history, can be hazardous unless relevant institutional differences as well as
similarities are taken into account.
4 One important similarity is the ‘fragmented’ nature
of political bodies including organised medicine due to long-standing ethno-linguistic
1R.F. Badgley, ‘Health Worker Strikes: Social and
Economic Bases of Conflict’, International Journal of
Health Services, 5 (1975), 9–17.
2In the case of Australia, doctors also resorted to a
strike to arrest the development of collective payment
schemes through worker organisations: David G.
Green, ‘The 1918 Strike of the Medical Profession
against the Friendly Societies in Victoria’, Labour
History, 46 (1984), 72–87.
3See Stephen L. Thompson and J. Warren
Salmon, ‘Strikes by Physicians: A Historical
Perspective Toward an Ethical Evaluation’,
International Journal of Health Services, 36 (2006),
331–54. On the lack of evidence concerning the post-
war decline in the power of the medical profession,
see David Mechanic, ‘Sources of Countervailing
Power in Medicine’, Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law, 16 (1991), 485–506.
4Richard Rose, Learning from Comparative
Public Policy: A Practical Guide (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2005).
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204divisions within the respective societies: English–French in Canada and French–Dutch in
Belgium.
5 Another commonality is the extent to which the medical profession has pro-
tected fee-for-service remuneration from reform efforts to adopt salary and capitation
forms of remuneration in order to improve the quality of primary healthcare. As a result,
the fee-for-service method of payment became embedded in the public healthcare sys-
tems of Canada and Belgium.
6
There were also significant differences between the two countries in the 1960s.
Canada was (and remains) a relatively decentralised federation, such that the original
flashpoint for the confrontation between doctors and the state occurred in one province,
although this conflict had a determinative influence on future national developments.
Conversely, as a unitary state in the 1960s – Belgium only became a constitutional fed-
eration in 1993 – the conflict between organised medicine and the state was at the
national level. Another important difference is the more statist nature of Canada’s tax-
based, governmental health system relative to Belgium’s more private, though more cor-
poratist, social insurance system.
7
From Ineffective Resistance to Effective Opposition, 1945–59
The 1950s marked a critical ideological, sociological, and material transition for orga-
nised medicine in both Canada and Belgium. The medical establishment in both coun-
tries resisted key aspects of universal public healthcare. In the first phase immediately
following the Second World War, this elite discovered that it had less influence in shap-
ing public healthcare policy than it felt it deserved: organised medicine in Belgium was
even barred from the negotiations that led to compulsory health insurance in 1945. As
physicians improved their economic position in the post-war prosperity of the 1950s,
medical organisations in both countries became more ideologically opposed to the wel-
fare state’s expansion in general, and to increasing government intervention in the fund-
ing and administration of medical care in particular.
By the late 1950s, doctors actively resisted the extension and deepening of universal
healthcare policies. In Canada, a twenty-three-day strike in 1962 forced major compro-
mises from the government, granting doctors the option to work outside the public med-
ical care insurance scheme, and entrenching an arm’s-length and contractual fee-for-
service model of primary and specialised care. In Belgium, an eighteen-day strike in
1964 forced a major retreat by the Belgian government and the privileging of the fee-
for-service model of remuneration.
In June 1944, the first social democratic party to be elected in Canada formed the gov-
ernment in the province of Saskatchewan and remained in power for the next twenty
5Gregory P. Marchildon, ‘Postmodern Federalism
and Sub-State Nationalism’, in A. Ward and
L. Ward (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to
Federalism (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 441–55.
6On the determinative impact of major historical
events on the subsequent development of public
health insurance in advanced industrial nations, see
Jacob S. Hacker, ‘The Historical Logic of National
Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the
Development of British, Canadian, and US Medical
Policy’, Studies in American Political Development,
12 (1998) 57–130.
7Daniel Be ´land and Andre ´ Lecours, ‘Sub-State
Nationalism and Social Policy Decentralization in
Canada and Belgium’, Regional and Federal Studies,
17 (2006) 405–19.
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205years.
8 With a population of less than a million people, the majority of whom lived in
medically under-serviced rural areas, the province of Saskatchewan may have seemed
an unlikely candidate to initiate North America’s first major experiment in universal
health insurance. However, it was precisely the rural nature of Saskatchewan and the chal-
lenge in attracting physicians and providing hospital care that led to the implementation of
salaried doctor schemes and publicly owned hospitals at the local government level earlier
in the twentieth century.
9 Moreover, T.C. (Tommy) Douglas, as the provincial head of the
social democratic party (known as the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, or CCF)
and the premier of the new government, was personally committed to the incremental
introduction of comprehensive public healthcare. For this reason, he assumed the addi-
tional role of health minister for the first six years of his administration. During this first
period, Douglas introduced universal hospital coverage for all provincial residents.
10
In 1958, Saskatchewan received shared cost financing for its hospital plan from the
Government of Canada, thereby freeing the resources Douglas needed to offer universal
physician care coverage. Both his cabinet and the civil service were mobilised to produce
an entirely tax-funded scheme with the government acting as the single payer for all
medically necessary physician services.
11 However, the government faced significant
opposition from doctors to this plan. While physicians had largely co-operated with
the provincial government’s introduction of universal hospital care insurance in the
late 1940s, the profession, and the mindset of its leaders, changed dramatically during
the course of the 1950s. In the 1940s, physicians supported the principle of state payment
of hospital bills in part because of their own experience with destitute patients and
unpaid bills during the Great Depression, when almost one-third of all provincial resi-
dents were on relief due to the collapse of the wheat-based economy. As their incomes
rose in the 1950s, many doctors could not see the same benefit flowing from universal
medical care insurance.
12 By the end of the decade, some 250 out of the 750 practising
doctors in Saskatchewan were also recent immigrants from the United Kingdom, self-
styled refugees from the National Health Service (NHS) with a deep antipathy to public
healthcare.
13 Saskatchewan doctors also had collective interests to protect. Through their
8Although contemporaries applied both ‘socialist’
and ‘social democratic’ labels to the CCF party and
government, the Saskatchewan government was a
reformist government in the tradition of social
democratic and labourist governments in Europe,
including the reformist-oriented Belgian ‘Socialist’
Party: see Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian
Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation in Saskatchewan (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1950), and Marcel Liebman, ‘The
Crisis of Belgian Social Democracy’, Socialist
Register, 3 (1966), 44–65.
9Clarence Stuart Houston, Steps on the Road to
Medicare: Why Saskatchewan Led the Way,
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002),
28–40.
10On the Saskatchewan Hospital Services Plan,
see Malcolm G. Taylor, Health Insurance and
Canadian Public Policy: The Seven Decisions that
Created the Canadian Health System, (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978), 69–104.
11A.W. Johnson, Dream No Little Dreams: A
Biography of the Douglas Government of
Saskatchewan, 1944–1961 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2004), 240–1; Gregory P. Marchildon,
‘Interdepartmental Committee on Medicare, 1959’,
Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan (Regina: Canadian
Plains Research Center, 2005), 482; Vincent L.
Matthews, memorandum entitled ‘Extended Health
Insurance – Alternate Approaches in Saskatchewan’,
21 April 1959, RE679, College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Archives
Board, Regina [hereafter SAB].
12Aleck Ostry, ‘Prelude to Medicare: Institutional
Change and Continuity in Saskatchewan,
1944–1962’, Prairie Forum, 20 (1995), 87–105.
13Taylor, op. cit. (note 10), 265–6.
Gregory P. Marchildon and Klaartje Schrijvers
206provincial-based organisation they were responsible for two physician-based medical
care insurance carriers with 308,000 provincial residents as clients, roughly one-third
of the entire provincial population.
14
For historical reasons, physicians in Saskatchewan were organised differently from
most provinces.
15 To save money during the Great Depression, the regulatory adminis-
tration (the College) was fused with the political organisation (the Association) under
a single College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan.
16 This arrangement forced
all members to pay dues to cover both functions, and physicians could not register any
potential disagreement with the political goals and strategies of the College by opting
out of the political organisation.
17
In October 1959, after months of private discussions within its policy-making subcom-
mittee, the College finally released its judgment on Douglas’s plan for government-
administered, single-payer medical care insurance. At its annual meeting on 29 October
1959, the College passed a resolution – unanimously supported – to ‘oppose the intro-
duction of a compulsory government-controlled province-wide medical care plan, and
declare our support of, and the extension of health and sickness benefits through indem-
nity, and service plans.’
18 Stating that doctors would ‘not look kindly on any plan that is
introduced without the say of the voters’, the College demanded a province-wide refer-
endum so that those opposed to the government plan would have ample opportunity to
voice their case, arguing that many ‘doctors would not work under a scheme that was
brought in without a referendum.’
19
On 16 December 1959, Douglas announced his government’s plan to introduce a sin-
gle-payer, compulsory, and universal plan, but only after consultations had been con-
ducted by a Committee that included four physicians, three of whom were drawn from
the College. He left it to this appointed Committee to design a programme that met his
requirements, yet somehow be acceptable to a majority of doctors despite the growing
resistance from organised medicine in Saskatchewan and the rest of Canada against sin-
gle-payer, compulsory, and universal insurance plans.
20
Operating under the assumption that the College was merely negotiating for better
terms under the proposed government plan with what he perceived as exaggerated
14Taylor, ibid., 261. The two physician-based
insurance carriers were Medical Services
Incorporated (MSI), based in Saskatoon, and Group
Medical Services (GMS), headquartered in Regina.
15Of the ten Canadian provinces, only organised
medicine in Alberta and British Columbia adopted the
same practice as Saskatchewan for a limited time: C.
David Naylor, Private Practice, Public Payment:
Canadian Medicine and the Politics of Health
Insurance, 1911–1966 (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1986), 95–6.
16This arrangement – considered a conflict of
interest in other jurisdictions – remained in place until
the mid-1960s when criticism of the arrangement by a
provincial Royal Commission led to the separation of
the advocacy and trade union functions through the
Saskatchewan Medical Association from the
regulatory functions performed by the College. Royal
Commission on Hospital Privileges (Chair, Justice
Mervyn Woods), Blakeney Papers, R353, 138, SAB.
17Taylor, op. cit. (note 10), 264–5.
18Resolution repeated in document ‘Government
in Medicine in Saskatchewan in 1960’ by Dr J.F.C.
Anderson, R30.1, XXVIII.1 (3 of 3), College of
Physicians and Surgeons, SAB.
19Draft of news release for H. Dagliesh, 28
October 1959, R30.1, XXVIII.1, misc. files, College
of Physicians and Surgeons, SAB.
20Transcript of Premier T.C. Douglas, Provincial
Affairs Series, ‘Prepaid Medical Care’, [hereafter
Douglas radio broadcast on Medicare], 16 December
1959, R33.1–575a, T.C. Douglas Papers, SAB. At the
time, Douglas stated that the medical profession
would have four of the ten slots on the Advisory
Planning Committee, three of whom would be from
organised medicine and the fourth from the College
of Medicine at the University of Saskatchewan.
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207rhetoric, the Douglas government continued on its course, confidant that a majority of
doctors would come to accept, if grudgingly, the inevitability of universal medical care
insurance.
21 Douglas publicly stated that his government had ‘no intention of pushing
some pre-conceived plan down the doctors’ throats. We want their co-operation and
from our experience with other health programs I am convinced we will get it.’
22 He
had hoped to secure this co-operation through a representative committee, appointed
by the government with College participation, mandated to provide the government
with a consensus report. Instead, the College used its position on the committee to delay
government action, and ultimately prepared a minority report that insisted on govern-
ment subsidisation of private insurance (mainly the physician-sponsored insurance car-
riers) rather than the introduction of a state-sponsored single-payer plan.
23
Similar miscalculations were made by the Belgian government in an effort to trans-
form its fragmented social health insurance system into a British-style national health
system in the early 1960s. The reforms targeted the five health insurance funds (mutua-
lite ´s) that had been transformed into compulsory funds by the Belgian government in the
immediate aftermath of the German occupation during the Second World War. These
funds were organised in political-ideological groupings, including Liberal, Socialist,
and Christian funds. Although physicians had argued for decades in favour of neutral
funds without alliances to political parties, their views were largely ignored. As a social
elite, Belgian doctors resented being disregarded, but their own organisational and poli-
tical weaknesses left them unable to influence the shape of the ultimate plans and prevent
an erosion of their unfettered right to set their own fees. Instead, the umbrella public
institution for the five funds – known as l’Assurance Maladie-Invalidite ´, or AMI –
took control of setting fees for both specialists and general practitioners.
Although there was considerable discussion about reform of Belgian social health insur-
ance due to rising costs in the years that followed, it was not until 1959 that reforming the
deficit-ridden AMI was seriously contemplated. In that year, Edmond Leburton, the new
chair of the Socialist health insurance fund, began his campaign for a single, national health
service similar to the NHS in Britain. In his view, there were two reasons for the growing
deficits. The first was the high administrative costs associated with the division of health
insurance into five separate and competitive funds. The second was the inflationary impact
of fee-for-service practice. In his inaugural speech at the Socialist Party Congress in Sep-
tember 1959, Leburton criticised doctors as profiteers: ‘I cannot help thinking they are
Galeazzi-Lisi, the doctor of Pius XII, who filmed the last hours of the Pope to assure him-
self of a good income. How many doctors place their own ego above all considerations?’
24
21Allan Blakeney, An Honourable Calling:
Political Memoirs (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2008), 49; Johnson, op. cit. (note 11), 251. As a
deputy minister in the government for almost a
decade, Johnson’s judgment was that at the time
Douglas announced Medicare ‘and indeed for a long
time after, the premier and ministers still believed –
indeed were confident – that a consensus could be
achieved between them and the college.’
22Douglas radio broadcast on Medicare, 16
December 1959, R33.1–575a, T.C. Douglas Papers,
SAB.
23Report of the Advisory Planning Committee on
Medical Care to the Government of Saskatchewan –
Interim Report 1961 and Final Report 1962 (Regina:
Department of Public Health, 1962); W.P. Thompson,
Medical Care: Programs and Issues (Toronto:
Clarke, Irwin, 1964).
24Recht op Gezondheid (Claims for Health),
speech by Edmond Leburton given at the Socialist
Party (BSP) congress of 19 September 1959, 14,
Archive of the Flemish Doctors Syndicate VAS in
Antwerp.
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208In pursuit of his dream of a Belgian NHS, Leburton persuaded Le ´on Servais, the Min-
ister of Social Healthcare, to establish a parliamentary working group to re-examine the
fundamental principles of public healthcare. Five members of parliament from the three
major political parties (Socialist, Christian and Liberal) negotiated together. As was the
case in 1945, the doctors were not consulted.
25
By 1960, Belgium was suffering a recession. The government responded by tightening
its belt, which triggered massive protests throughout the country. The catalyst for this
upheaval was the Loi Unique (Single Law) introduced by the Christian-Liberal coalition
government to counter the economic crisis. From opposition benches, the Socialist Party
contested the economic measures incorporated in the Loi Unique. At the close of 1960
and beginning of 1961, riots and strikes erupted in Belgium. Despite this concerted resis-
tance, the Loi Unique was ratified on 13 January 1961.
26 Some of the new budgetary
constraints directly affected doctors. To counter the abuses of the AMI, the Loi Unique
placed the five health funds under stricter administrative controls that fixed the fees for
all physician consultations. Further, Article 52 of the Loi Unique stipulated that doctors
who did not comply with the maximum rates would be subject to fines and, in extreme
cases, jail sentences.
27
Enraged by these measures, Belgian physicians founded the Contact Commission to
present their complaints in a single voice to the government, but the Commission’s
objections were ignored. On 26 March 1961, national elections yielded a new Socialist–
Christian coalition government, and Leburton was appointed Minister of Social Health-
care.
28 This regime change precipitated an even more hostile relationship between the
Belgian government and organised medicine. It would also signal to physicians the
necessity of establishing a more effective political organisation if they were to have
any chance of preventing the introduction of socialised medicine. In this, they found
an ally in the Liberal Party, now in opposition to the coalition, but the doctors ultimately
concluded that they needed to be prepared to go it alone in the coming struggle with the
government.
Mobilising Forces and Preparing for Strike
Though not identical, the more immediate factors precipitating the mobilisation of phy-
sicians in Canada and Belgium were similar. In the Canadian case, it was the determina-
tion of the social democratic government of Saskatchewan to implement universal,
single-payer medical care insurance. In the Belgian case, it was the determination
of the Socialist–Christian coalition government and its Socialist minister of health to
reform public healthcare without input from the medical profession. Although physicians
25Institute Emile Vandervelde, PSP Bureau 1960,
14 October 1960 and KADOC [Documentation and
Research Centre for Religion, Culture and Society],
LCM [Catholic Health Insurance Fund], Direction
Archive, 29, Executive Committee, 13 June 1961.
26Marc Hooghe and Ann Jooris, Golden Sixties: la
Belgique dans les anne ´es soixante: 1958–1973
(Ghent: Ludion-ASLK, 1999), 14.
27Annual Report 1960. KADOC, Archive of the
Algemeen Syndicaat, Box 24; also: ‘De Eenheidswet’
[‘Loi Unique’], Belgisch Staatsblad [Belgian Bulletin
of Acts], 13 January 1961.
28Guy Vanthemsche, De Beginjaren van de
Sociale Zekerheid in Belgie ¨. 1944–1963 (Brussels:
VUB Press, 1994), 140.
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209in Saskatchewan, assisted by the Canadian Medical Association, already had a disci-
plined political organisation to battle the government, physicians in Belgium had to cre-
ate the political structure for waging a disciplined and effective campaign against the
government. In both cases, the governments presumed that the doctors would not have
the cohesiveness and discipline to conduct a sustained extra-parliamentary struggle
against their respective health system reforms. To accomplish this, organised medicine
in both countries employed remarkably similar strategies and tactics which included
establishing: a commanding and controlling political organisation; pyramidal communi-
cations with members; public information campaigns; centralised fund raising; and effec-
tive penalties on hesitant or dissident physicians.
By the end of the 1950s, doctors in the rest of Canada realised that Saskatchewan was
about to become the battleground that would determine the practice of medicine within a
redesigned payment system administered by the state. As a consequence, the Canadian
Medical Association (CMA), the national umbrella organisation for the provincial medical
associations, provided considerable financial and in-kind support to Saskatchewan doctors
in their struggle against the provincial government.
29 The College spent more on the 1960
campaign than either the social democrats (known as the Co-operative Commonwealth
Federation or CCF) or the opposition Liberal Party. In addition, the Ontario Medical
Association – the largest and most powerful of the provincial chapters of the CMA –
sent its public relations guru to Saskatchewan to assist the College in its media blitz.
Indeed, the struggle in Saskatchewan was perceived to be the frontline of a larger North
American war, and the American Medical Association (AMA) also provided financial
support to Saskatchewan physicians. More important was what the College in Saskatch-
ewan and the CMA learned from the AMA’s experiences in its long struggle against
health system reform in the United States. In particular, the College would adopt the
AMA’s key man system, creating cells of up to ten doctors under the control and direc-
tion of a well-known and trustworthy doctor (hence the ‘key man’) who would be solely
responsible for receiving and sending communications up and down in the organisation.
30
Premier Douglas of Saskatchewan recognised the high stakes when he restated his
determination to implement universal, compulsory, single-payer medical care insurance
by 1961: ‘If we can do this – and I feel sure we can – then I would like to hazard the
prophecy that before 1970 almost every other province in Canada will have followed
the lead of Saskatchewan as we shall have national health insurance programs for
[Canada as a whole].’
31 Although Douglas had intended his proposed scheme of medical
care insurance to be the leading issue in the provincial election of June 1960, he did not
anticipate the extent to which the College was willing to turn the election into a referen-
dum on this single issue.
32
The College levied a mandatory fee of $100 on all its members to fund its extensive
public relations campaign for the election. It delivered publicity kits to all doctors to ensure
29Naylor, op. cit. (note 15), 184–5.
30Robin F. Badgley and Samuel Wolfe, Doctor’s
Strike: Medical Care and Conflict in Saskatchewan
(New York: Atherton Press, 1967), 30 and 54.
31Douglas quoted in Naylor, op. cit. (note 15),
182–3.
32Allan M. Briens, ‘The 1960 Saskatchewan
Provincial Election’ (unpublished MA thesis:
University of Saskatchewan, 2004), 30.
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210that the media and the public received consistent messages from its members.
33 One exam-
ple of the College’s approach was a draft speech it sent to its members on 5 May 1960.
While individual doctors had the flexibility to ‘change wording’ into their ‘own
phraseology’, the College warned members ‘not to stray’ from the hard line message:
Saskatchewan’s 930 doctors are unalterably opposed to the introduction of a government controlled
compulsory prepaid medical care plan, or in plain language, state medicine. Our main reasons for
opposition are based on two factors: compulsion, and government control. We are convinced that
these factors would be responsible for lowering of the standards of medical care for our patients.
Our position may be defined as unalterable.
34
The College also purchased advertisements in local community newspapers similar to
this notice in the Humboldt Journal: ‘We would all like to continue practising in Hum-
bolt as your private family physician; however, if state medicine is forced upon us by any
government, you can see that we would have no choice other than to move to a province
which would allow us our freedom.’
35
There was general approval for a tax-funded medical care insurance plan, despite a
large and vocal dissenting minority – a national poll suggested that sixty per cent of
Canadians supported tax-funded medical care insurance in 1960.
36 This popular support
helped carry Douglas and his social democratic party to victory in the election. Believing
he had received a mandate from the people of the province to move ahead with his plan,
Douglas demanded a report from the deadlocked Advisory Planning Committee. Unable
to defer any longer, the majority on the Committee – sympathetic to the government plan
and in support of salary or capitation replacing fee-for-service remuneration – attempted
a last compromise with the College minority, and accepted fee-for-service remuneration
for doctors.
37 Though the College representatives on the Committee acknowledged the
concession, the effort ultimately produced a majority–minority report that was delivered
in September 1961.
38 Beyond universal and compulsory coverage, the majority also
recommended that the lion’s share of funding come from general tax revenues, with
only a small share raised through flat tax premium payments.
39
The Douglas government responded swiftly to the report. In October 1961, the Sas-
katchewan Medical Care Insurance Act, 1961, was introduced into the provincial legis-
lature without consultation with the College. Although the government had correctly
determined that further negotiation with the College would only lead to further delay
and deadlock, the doctors were able to point to the lack of consultation as evidence of
the government’s unwillingness to compromise, thereby creating a further rift between
33Naylor, op. cit. (note 15), 185–6.
34Quoted in speech by T.C. Douglas: Legislative
Assembly of Saskatchewan: Debates and
Proceedings, Volume 11, 25 October 1961, 71.
35Quoted in speech by T.C. Douglas, Debates,
Volume 11, 25 October 1961, 72.
36In a Gallup poll conducted in late 1960, six out
of ten Canadians supported a state-led (single-payer)
medical care insurance plan ‘even if this meant an
increase in taxes’: Naylor, op. cit. (note 15), 191.
37Douglas himself had always been willing to
compromise on the issue of remuneration: Gordon S.
Lawson, ‘The Road Not Taken: The 1945 Health
Services Planning Commission Proposals and
Physician Remuneration in Saskatchewan’, Canadian
Bulletin of Medical History, 26 (2009), 155–87.
38Thompson, op. cit. (note 23), 65; Naylor, op. cit.
(note 15), 193–5.
39Advisory Planning Committee on Medical Care,
Interim Report of the Advisory Planning Committee
on Medical Care to the Government of Saskatchewan:
September 1961 (Regina: Queen’s Printer, 1962).
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211the profession and the government. In the provincial legislature, Tommy Douglas led the
debate on the bill, but just before the law was passed, he resigned as Premier to become
the first national leader of the newly formed social democratic party – the New Demo-
cratic Party (NDP). The national NDP, coupled with its provincial branches and orga-
nised labour unions throughout Canada, now had a major political stake in successful
health system reform in Saskatchewan. In the same way that the College could depend
on the active support of the CMA, the insurance industry, and business lobbies through-
out the country, the Saskatchewan government could rely on the national NDP and NDP
oppositions to provincial governments as well as affiliated trade unions throughout
Canada.
40
Woodrow Lloyd replaced Douglas as party leader and Premier of Saskatchewan. He
and his newly appointed Minister of Health tried to reopen discussions with the Col-
lege’s leaders, but they mistook Lloyd’s willingness to negotiate as an indication of
weakness that only hardened their position. However, by April 1962, the Lloyd govern-
ment appeared ready to give way on two key issues. In a letter to the College, Lloyd sug-
gested that the physician-based private insurance plans might be allowed to continue
under some strict understandings concerning the package of benefits, the amount
assessed for premiums, and the remuneration of doctors. Second, despite his grave con-
cerns about the potential impact on the principle of universality, Lloyd would allow doc-
tors to opt out of the plan and directly charge patients. This was, in his own words, ‘a
desperate measure to prevent the threat of withdrawal of services on July 1st.’
41
Although the government had seemingly conceded the principle of single-payer admin-
istration, the College rejected the compromise as ‘not fundamentally altering the legis-
lation’, and offered its own ‘final offer’. The College insisted that the only satisfactory
plan would involve government subsidies to private insurance carriers, in which doctors
would be permitted to bill all patients (except indigents).
42
In order to force the government to withdraw its law, the College threatened a pro-
vince-wide doctors’ strike. To demonstrate membership support, the College asked all
available doctors in the province to attend a two-day emergency meeting in Regina in
early May 1962. Almost 600 doctors – two-thirds of the province’s 900 physicians –
closed their offices in order to attend. Realising the danger posed by organised med-
icine’s escalating militancy, Premier Lloyd asked if he could also address the meeting:
the College leaders agreed, expecting that the doctors attending would impress upon
Lloyd the profession’s readiness to strike if their demands were not met. The raucous,
anti-government tenor of the meeting was buoyed considerably by the news that a cabi-
net minister – a former minister of health no less – had suddenly resigned from the gov-
ernment. When Lloyd took the stage, he was hissed and jeered. Immediately following
Lloyd’s hour-long appeal to the unreceptive audience, the College’s president called
for a standing vote on a motion stating physicians would refuse to practise under the
40Letter with attached pamphlet, E.P. O’Neal
(Secretary–Treasurer, B.C. Federation of Labour) to
W.G. Davies, 1 June 1962, R-30.1, XXVIII.1 (2 0f 9),
W.G. Davies Papers, SAB.
41Letter, W.S. Lloyd to Rev. C. Jackson, 27 June
1962, R 30.1, XXVIII.1 (4 of 9), W.G. Davies Papers,
SAB.
42Naylor, op. cit. (note 15), 200–1; letter, W.G.
Davies to Rev. N.T. Quigley, 25 May 1962, R30.1,
XXVIII.1 (3 of 9), W.G. Davies Papers, SAB.
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212government’s new scheme. All but five doctors stood and applauded enthusiastically in
support.
43 It was now evident that a majority of doctors were prepared to go on strike.
A similar mass meeting in Brussels in 1964 would also publicise the extent to which
the majority of Belgian doctors supported strike action. Unlike the situation in Canada,
however, before this could occur, a more radical and pan-Belgian political organisation
for doctors needed to be forged.
44
It is significant that most Belgian doctors were deeply opposed to the health system
reforms proposed by the new Christian–Socialist coalition, as this shared foe unified
the previously fragmented profession. Although the Fe ´de ´rations Me ´dicale Belge (Belgian
Medical Federation, or FMB) was a century old, it was ineffective as a political organisa-
tion because of linguistic strife and professional conflicts. For example, a separate Flem-
ish organisation (Algemeen Syndicaat der Geneesheren van Belgie ¨, or AS) had been
established in 1954, followed by a separate organisation for specialists that same year,
and one for generalists in 1959.
45 Facing Edmond Leburton as Minister of Health, Bel-
gian physicians began to construct a more unified and organised opposition. Unable to
influence the government directly, the doctors formed a new national organisation, the
Association Ge ´ne ´rale des Me ´decins Belges (General Association of Belgian Physicians,
or AGMB), that clustered the old FMB with the younger, breakaway organisations.
46
In July 1961, the AGMB published a White Paper criticising the Loi Unique as well
as the parliamentary working group’s recommendations. The doctors also issued their
own AMI reform proposal, and demanded to be involved in all future governmental
deliberations on the AMI. The physician leaders also warned the parliamentary working
group of the consequences that might flow from health system reforms that ignored the
position of the doctors as articulated in the White Paper.
47
The parliamentary working group initially dismissed the AGMB’s requests, but as ten-
sions mounted, Leburton reluctantly entered negotiations with five AGMB representatives.
Surprisingly, Leburton and the five AGMB delegates reached an agreement. However, the
protocol of 20 October 1961 was signed by the five AGMB negotiators without the knowl-
edge,muchless theconsent,ofthemajorityoftheirmembers.MostBelgiandoctorslearned
ofthe pact through the media.
48 Stunned,thedoctors attackedthe credibilityandlegitimacy
of the negotiators after the public announcement. The Christian health fund also opposed
the protocol because it had been excluded from the negotiations.
49 These objections con-
vinced the rest of the Cabinet to abandon Leburton by not approving the protocol. The
consequences were even more severe for the future of the AGMB and its negotiators.
43Badgley and Wolfe, op. cit. (note 30), 49;
Taylor, op. cit. (note 10), 297; W.S. Lloyd’s address
to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Saskatchewan, 3 May 1962, R 30.1, XXVIII.4,
Saskatchewan Medicare/College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Saskatchewan, SAB.
44J.V. Craven, ‘A Strike of Self-Employed
Professionals: Belgian Doctors in 1964’, Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 21 (1967), 18–30.
45Vanthemsche, op. cit. (note 28), 154.
46Belgian Doctors Bulletin, 23 (1960), 996–7.
47‘Article’ in Mededelingen van het Algemeen
Syndicaat [Announcements of the General Syndicate],
11 January 1961, VII, 9 (KADOC, Archief Algemeen
Syndicaat, Box 25).
48Protocol between the Minister of Social
Healthcare and the AGMB, 20 October 1961
(KADOC, Achive General Syndicat, Box 25).
49Preparation of the law (KADOC, Archive P.W.
Segers, nr. 10.8.1.3.1/1). Important representatives of
this new generation were the doctors Andre ´ Wynen,
Roger Thone ´, Toon Malfliet, Alex De Bruyn, and
Mundeleer.
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213The generational divide among Belgian doctors helped fuel a revolt within the ranks of
organised medicine. A younger group of doctors rejected the old guard’s leadership and
its efforts to create a more effective political organisation at the national level. In 1960,
the age of the typical member of this younger generation hovered around forty. Most of
these doctors had been obliged to interrupt their studies because of the Second World
War, when many of them were anti-German resisters in the Belgian underground or
the maquis as it was known.
50 These experiences would come to be formative in the
decision to strike and in the deployment of effective strike tactics.
51 In the summer of
1961, thirty-six of these younger doctors held two secret meetings in Luxembourg.
52
These meetings would mark the beginning of a fundamental reconstitution of organised
medicine in Belgium.
53
While the older doctors were more amenable to working out an accommodation with
the government, their junior colleagues were unwilling to compromise, preferring to
launch a general strike in order to force the government to concede. To circumvent future
compromise, the self-styled action committee of younger physicians prepared a letter
instructing all doctors to not sign anything from the AGMB. In the view of the young
activists, the time for negotiation had ended, and the time for battle had arrived.
54
On 30 May 1962 the first (Lie `ge-Luxembourg) of five syndical chambers of medicine
was officially founded.
55 These chambers were more overtly political and militant than
any previous organisation, borrowing heavily from methods of the Belgian resistance
in the Second World War. Despite their underground nature, the five chambers would
50Maquis or ‘macchia’ is a type of high ground
covered in thick vegetation where Corsican bandits
used to hide. The name was adopted by a number of
underground movements in French-speaking
countries.
51See on this subject Andre ´ Wynen, Ou ` allez-vous
docteur Wynen? 25 ans de combat me ´dical: le patron
des me ´decin belges re ´pond a ` Omer Marchal [Where
Are You Going Dr Wynen? 25 Years of Medical
Battle: The Belgian Head of Medicine Answers Omer
Marchal ] (Brussels: Didier Hatier, 1989). This thesis
was also confirmed by Dr Toon Malfliet (interview
with Toon Malfliet by Philippe Van Meerbeeck, 1995
VRT Image Archive, for the television programme
Boulevard Doctors). See also, ‘Le processus de
syndicalisation dans la function me ´dicale: la
constitution et le development des chambers
syndicales de me ´decins’, Courrier hebdomadaire du
Centre de recherche et d’information socio-politiques
[hereafter CRISP CH], 231 (1964), 12–14.
52Report SK Lie `ge of the meeting in Marche-en-
Famenne 17 August 1961 and the meeting in Aarlen
28 August 1961 (Archive SK Lie `ge).
53See Klaartje Schrijvers, ‘De artsenstaking van
1964: Een studie van een conflict tussen twee elites’
[‘The Doctors’ Strike of 1964: A Study of a Conflict
Between Two Elites’] (unpublished MA thesis:
University of Ghent, 2002). This research was only
possible because the founder of the Syndical Chamber
of Lie `ge had preserved a large archive never
previously consulted. This combined with extensive
interview evidence permitted a reconstruction of the
Belgian doctors’ strike.
54‘Prenez conscience du fait que l’heure est grave.
La lutte est commence ´e. Ne vous trompez pas: il
s’agit la ` d’une tentative d’e ´tatisation!’ Circular letter
of the Comite ´ Me ´dical d’Action, Lie `ge, 30 November
1961 (Archive Chamber Lie `ge) and KADOC,
Archive General Syndicate, Box 25. Although the
structure was tempting, it took a while before the
other four chambers were founded. In March 1963,
Andre ´ Wynen founded the chamber of Henegouwen-
Waals-Brabant. One of the main protagonists in the
doctors’ strike, Wynen also played a crucial role in
the formation of the other chambers. On 31 May,
Mundeleer founded the chamber of the Brussels
agglomeration. In August, the chamber of Antwerp-
Limburg-Vlaams-Brabant and the chamber of Oost-
West-Vlaanderen were founded. In the meantime, a
National League of Chambers was created and
directed by Roger Thone ´. The province of Namur
joined with the creation of the Chamber
Henegouwen-Waals-Brabant on 4 October See: Le
processus de syndicalisation, op. cit. (note 51),
12–14.
55Unofficially, this chamber already existed. See:
Letter, W.J. Carels to liberal senator Norbert
Hougardy, 24 February 1962 (Archive Chamber
Lie `ge).
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214successfully recruit a majority of doctors such that, on the eve of the 1964 strike, they
represented ninety per cent of Belgian doctors. The chambers had two essential fea-
tures.
56 First, the members were divided into cells of ten doctors. Each cell had one
representative who was in direct contact with the direction committee and acted as an
intermediary. This structure was derived from the cell structure of the Belgian under-
ground in the Second World War, inspired in turn by the communist-led partisan move-
ment.
57 Second, all critical communications were funnelled through a pyramidal
telephone structure in which the chambers’ leaders would communicate with the appro-
priate cell representative who would then relay messages to the cell members. Although
personal meetings and written communications were generally avoided, any circular let-
ters were prepared in both French and Dutch to ensure solidarity across the language
divide. In addition, generalists and specialists were treated equally within the chamber.
Unlike organised medicine in Canada, previous physician organisations in Belgium
did not have an expert central office to manage finances and raise external funds, or
manage internal communications and external publicity. The chambers addressed this
weakness by establishing a technical bureau directed by a secretary-general and staffed
by lawyers, economists, tax specialists, and public relations advisors. This remarkable
shift went unnoticed by the government, and cloaked the older organisations – particu-
larly the AGMB – that continued to operate as if nothing had changed. In fact, the gov-
ernment upheld the status of the AGMB as the legitimate bargaining agent for doctors,
even though real authority and legitimacy had shifted to the syndical chambers. In Sep-
tember 1962, when Leburton reopened negotiations through a new parliamentary work-
ing group, he invited the same five AGMB representatives with whom he had drafted the
stillborn protocol of 1961. Moreover, when Belgian doctors formally dissolved the
AGMB two months later, the government interpreted this action as an indication of frag-
mentation and disorganisation among physicians that could be exploited by ignoring the
profession when formulating a new bill.
58
The most important objective of the government was cost containment. To achieve
this, the government insisted on regulating doctors’ fees through a state institution, the
Institut National d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidite ´ (National Institute for Sicknesss and
Disability, or INAMI). The regulations, due to come into force on 1 January 1964, stipu-
lated that any doctors audited by the INAMI would be required to provide full informa-
tion concerning their patient billings.
59
When the draft bill was introduced, the chambers discovered that the five AGMB
representatives had once again approved the reform.
60 In its place, the chambers created
a new national emergency organisation, the National Committee for Common Action
(Comite ´ National d’Action Commune, or CNAC), representing all existing medical
56Internal regulation of the SK Lie `ge-
Luxembourg, May 1962 (Archive SK Lie `ge).
57Interview, Klaartje Schrijvers with Andre ´
Wynen, 16 November 2001.
58White Paper of the AGMB, after approval of the
Loi Leburton, in: Belgisch Geneesherenblad, 15: 31
August 1963, 808 (Archive VAS [Flemish Doctors’
Syndicate] Antwerp).
59Parliamentary documents, Chamber, nr 527, i:
Wetsontwerp tot instelling en organisatie van een
regeling voor verplichte ZIV [Amendment for the
Establishment and Organization of the Compulsory
ZIV], 8 March 1963; Craven, op. cit. (note 44), 23.
60White Paper of the ABGB, after approval of the
Loi Leburton, in Belgisch Geneesherenblad, 15: 31
August 1963, 807 (Archive VAS Antwerp).
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215associations.
61 Henceforth, the CNAC would be the doctors’ official representative in
negotiations, but still keeping the chambers largely hidden from the government. By
August 1963, the new bill – known as the Loi Leburton – had been finalised. While
the chambers had no interest in further negotiations, they did everything possible to
delay passage and implementation of the law. Meanwhile, the government continued
to negotiate with the old physician organisations, a convenient distraction while the
chambers prepared their members for a nationwide strike.
62 On 19 October 1963, the
first mass meeting of Belgian doctors protested the Loi Leburton. More than 4,500 doc-
tors (out of a total of 12,665 doctors in Belgium at that time) attended from every region
of the country, all stating they could never agree to the Loi Leburton.
63
The Conduct of the Doctors’ Strikes
Governments in Canada and Belgium were unprepared for the cohesiveness and effec-
tiveness of the doctors’ strikes. Moreover, the strategies and tactics of organised medi-
cine in both countries were similar. Doctors were organised in cells in order to
facilitate rapid and confidential communications, while isolating potential dissidents
and minimising their influence. They also used modern communications techniques in
order to stay ‘on message’ when dealing with government, media, and the general public.
Finally, organised medicine in both countries used social ostracism as a weapon against
dissident doctors who refused to toe organised medicine’s line or, even worse, engaged
in active strikebreaking.
Following their mass meeting in May 1962, Saskatchewan doctors, aided and abetted
by organised medicine in the rest of Canada, prepared for a general strike. The College
publicly announced that, if the government did not accept its final demand for a volun-
tary system of private medical care insurance supplemented by public subsidy, the
majority of doctors would go out on strike on 1 July 1962.
64 The College’s leadership
selected the doctors who would exit and the doctors who would remain to provide emer-
gency services. The College also determined which of a minority of hospitals would
remain staffed with doctors, thus precipitating the temporary closure of the rest.
65
Between April and July, a number of ‘keep our doctors’ (KOD) committees were
established in order to support the doctors. Originally started by married women con-
cerned about the possible loss of doctors in their communities and the impact this would
have on their families, these KOD committees mushroomed in number and visibility in
the weeks leading up to the strike. These committees may have managed to recruit
almost ten per cent (74,000 people) of the population by the time of the strike.
66 The
KOD committees were quickly infiltrated by anti-government forces including business
61Ibid., 817–820. See also Le processus de
syndicalisation, op. cit. (note 51), 11.
62Guy Spitaels, ‘Loi instituant et organisant un
re ´gime d’assurance obligatoire contre la maladie et
l’invalidite ´’, in Anne ´e Sociale (1963), 136–7.
63Report of the Staten–General, 19 October 1963
(Archive SK Lie `ge).
64‘Plebiscite Sought on Medicare’, Saskatoon
Star-Phoenix, 19 May 1962: R30.1, XXVIII.1 (7 of
9), W.G. Davies Papers, SAB.
65Letter, W.S. Lloyd to H. Fowler, C. Gibbings,
B. Johnson, L.L. Lloyd, B. Hamilton, W. Smishek, A.
Gleave and T. Beaubier, 23 May 1962, R20.1,
XXVIII.1 (3 of 9), W.G. Davies Papers, SAB.
66Badgley and Wolfe, op. cit. (note 30), 75.
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216organisations, the College, as well as opposition parties. KOD rallies and meetings were
held regularly in the weeks just before the strike, elevating the growing hysteria about
the impending strike deadline. Although trade unions and church groups that supported
the government’s position began to set up their own pro-reform civil society organisa-
tions, Premier Lloyd discouraged them from engaging too visibly or directly for fear
that this would simply elevate the already dangerously high level of public hysteria.
67
They complied, but their absence from the field only exaggerated the anti-government
voice, making the College even more confident that the government would back down
on the eve of the strike, a major miscalculation.
68
Realising that a strike was highly likely, the government began to recruit foreign doc-
tors to take the places of the Saskatchewan doctors. Calculating that it could only rely on
the support of between fifty and one hundred Saskatchewan doctors, and that the major-
ity of Canadian doctors outside the province would be hesitant to provide relief because
of the influence of the CMA, the Saskatchewan government began to recruit doctors
abroad, particularly in the United Kingdom. Through its influential contacts in the Brit-
ish Medical Association (BMA), the CMA did everything it could to discourage British
doctors from emigrating to Saskatchewan. On 17 May 1962, for example, the General
Secretary of the CMA wrote to the Under Secretary of the BMA:
Our colleagues in Saskatchewan are as near unanimous as it is possible to be that they cannot prac-
tise under the Act and retain professional freedom. I think it would be unkind and misleading for
British applicants to be subjected to these conditions of practice and I am afraid that they would be
regarded as strike breakers by Saskatchewan doctors.
69
The government also made emergency plans to airlift doctors from other countries,
including the United States, in the event of a prolonged strike. Even before the strike,
doctors began arriving from the United Kingdom, generating even more animosity
between the government and the majority of doctors in the province. These new doctors
also deepened the cleavage within the profession between those who supported the gov-
ernment and the majority against, a bitter division that was accentuated with the estab-
lishment of community clinics in those cities and towns in which pro-reform citizens
opened offices for doctors who were willing to practise during the strike. To help set
up the clinics, the government provided seed money to community groups to rent new
offices and recruit doctors supportive of health system reform.
70
Despite an attempt at mediation by the Saskatchewan Hospital Association in the last
days of June, the strike began as planned on 1 July 1962. Up to this point, the events
leading up to the strike had been followed closely by the provincial media and, to a lesser
extent, by the media in the rest of Canada. On the first day of the strike, however, media
from the rest of the world, particularly American and British newspapers, magazines, and
67Letter, W.S. Lloyd to D. Cross, 23 May 1962,
R30.1, XXVIII.1 (3 of 9), W.G. Davies Papers, SAB.
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Turnor (St Andrew’s Hospital, London), 26 June
1962, folder #2, pamphlet file, Medical Care Prepaid,
SAB.
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217medical journals had their own journalists cover the confrontation.
71 In the words of the
London Observer, ‘Saskatchewan has become a battlefield for the whole North American
continent in the struggle of the big medical organisations against “socialised
medicine”.’
72 There was a clear divide in the media with the majority of the provincial
media – community newspapers and local radio and television stations – supporting the
doctors, and only a minority supporting the government. In the rest of Canada, however,
the majority of newspapers and the national television stations leaned in favour of the
government position, arguing that the doctors had no right to strike against a democrati-
cally elected government and its decision to reform its health system. They were joined
in this view by a number of international publications, including The Lancet which, while
it had been sympathetic enough to the Saskatchewan doctors to bar the government from
placing recruitment advertisements for British physicians to practise in Saskatchewan,
nonetheless stated its objections to the College acting as a state within a state.
73
As the media tide turned against the College, a small group of clerical leaders in the
province met with Premier Lloyd and his inner cabinet ministers in an effort to come
up with a compromise they could sell to the College in order to bring the strike to an
end. Lloyd said he was still prepared to make the concessions previously offered plus
other ‘distinct possibilities’, but in return the College had to be prepared to get its mem-
bers to return to work immediately.
74 However, the doctors were not prepared to con-
sider ending the strike until after the failure of a major rally sponsored by the KOD on
11 July in front of the Legislative Assembly in the capital city of Regina. Although
the KOD groups and the College had expected between 25,000 and 50,000 to come to
Regina, only 5,000 people actually appeared on the day of the protest, deflating the spirit
of the doctors and adding resolve to the position of the government.
At a press conference towards the end of the protest, Premier Lloyd thanked the pro-
testors for avoiding violence even while expressing their disagreement with the govern-
ment. However, he castigated the KOD for impugning the motives and competencies of
doctors from the United Kingdom who had ‘left busy practices at home on short notice,
often at personal sacrifice’ and accused the College of exercising ‘its policing powers
under the Medical Professions Act as an offensive weapon against practitioners who
were not supporting the strike’ and announced the establishment of a Royal Commission
to investigate the College’s actions.
75
After the protest of 11 July, some physicians returned to work, and the College rea-
lised that its ability to continue the strike was waning. For its part, the government
invited Lord Stephen Taylor, a physician, member of the British House of Lords, and
a former Labour Party minister, to Saskatchewan to advise on a solution. Although not
invited by the College, Lord Taylor quickly gained the trust of the doctors and acted
as an intermediary between the College and the government. Listening patiently to the
71A.E. Blakeney, ‘Press Coverage of the Medicare
Dispute in Saskatchewan: I’, Queen’s Quarterly,7 0
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218criticisms of the doctors and rewording the concessions previously made by the
government while refusing to let either side deal with the other directly – to avoid
what he felt would be inevitable misunderstandings – Lord Taylor helped facilitate a
deal that became known as the Saskatoon Agreement. Signed by both parties on 23
July 1962, the compromise protected the right to fee-for-service remuneration and
allowed the physician insurance carriers to process cheques – but not underwrite insur-
ance – on behalf of doctors refusing to engage with the government directly.
76 With
these two concessions, the government obtained what it wanted – tax-based, universal
medical care insurance. Although the doctors could argue that they had won a victory
in terms of the continued legal existence of their private insurance carriers, the new pay-
ment mechanism was, in reality, a single-payer public system.
Twenty-one months after the strike in Canada, the doctors’ strike in Belgium would
take a very similar course, though the outcome would be interpreted very differently.
As in the Canadian case, the strike focused on the new law. Though the Belgian govern-
ment continued to seek the approval of physicians for the Loi Leburton, even negotiating
with organisations such as the CNAC, these efforts would only backfire. Instead, physi-
cians used these desperate efforts at conciliation to buy time to prepare for a major strike.
Despite the fact that most of organised medicine welcomed the delay, some doctors
were not willing to wait. To protest the law, 1,270 doctors from Lie `ge resigned from
the Order of Doctors, preventing them from practising medicine.
77 They hoped that their
action would be followed in the rest of the country but they had miscalculated. Mean-
while, the leadership of the chambers realised that time was running out. It was only a
matter of months, perhaps weeks, before the government realised that a doctors’ strike
was being planned. Once this occurred, the government was more than capable of scaring
off the less militant doctors by setting out the sanctions that would be meted out to phy-
sicians who joined the strike.
78 At the same time, the chambers still needed to recruit
more members in regions of the country where they were weaker, particularly in Flanders.
In January, the CNAC was abolished and the five chambers went above ground as the
political representative of the doctors. By the end of March 1964, following a second
mass meeting of eight thousand doctors, the chambers revealed that they had recruited
ninety per cent of Belgian doctors.
79 The show of strength convinced the government
to delay passing the bill. In a final attempt to avoid a general strike, the government
held a marathon meeting with the doctors on 31 March in order to obtain a compromise,
but to no avail.
80 The doctors had no intention of negotiating a settlement and had
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219already committed to packing their suitcases in the early hours of 1 April 1964 to leave
en masse for towns just beyond the Belgian border, such as Clervaux and Mondorf in
Luxembourg, Valkenburg in Holland, and Valenciennes in France.
81 At four in the morn-
ing, Dr Thone ´, on behalf of the five chambers, released a press statement announcing
that Belgian doctors in the country had commenced ‘total and unlimited strike’.
82 Having
managed to keep their strategy and preparations secret, the chambers quickly discovered
that their general strike shocked the government, the press, and the public.
83
On the ground, physicians were divided into three categories: 1) the majority who
went on vacation; 2) the ‘commandos’ who had to remain in place in order to carry
out any orders from the leadership including forcing recalcitrant doctors to go on vaca-
tion, and treating those that refused or disappeared as deserters;
84 and 3) the ‘guards’
who had to remain on active duty at the hospitals in order to decide whether patients
needed emergency care during the strike. The bureaux of the chambers were responsible
for supervising the strike as well as co-ordinating publicity and the printing of pamphlets.
As in the Canadian case, the Belgian doctors’ strike was subject to saturation reporting
by the media. Each day, NIR, Belgium’s public television station, broadcast daily news
and images of the strike. On radio stations, proponents and opponents of the strike con-
fronted and debated each other. Reporting constantly on the strike, the majority of news-
papers – including the extensive Catholic press – took an editorial position against the
strike, although a minority – in particular the liberal press – supported the doctors.
85
The strike would have a direct impact on the lives of most Belgians. No longer able to
consult their own physicians, they had to rely on doctors providing emergency care in
hospitals. Guarding access was a physician assigned to that post by the chambers. In
truth, such guards generally erred on the side of caution in terms of admitting patients.
The end result was that the hospitals were overcrowded within two days of the strike.
In response, the government opened the military hospitals, over which it had control,
to the general population. For those Belgians who did not need or seek medical help,
they nonetheless confronted a crisis atmosphere. Ambulances raced through the cities
with blaring sirens while the media focused on individual incidents highlighting the dan-
ger to health and life posed by the strike.
86 With little or no evidence to back up their
respective claims, both sides used such incidents to prove the extent to which either
the strike or the government was endangering Belgians through their respective actions.
87
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220Despite public pressure on both sides, the reopening of negotiations seemed impossi-
ble in the first week of the strike. Both sides issued ultimatums, the government insisting
that it would only negotiate once the doctors returned to work, and doctors insisting on
major revisions to the law before they would call an end to the strike. Then, on 9 April,
the rectors of the four Belgians universities intervened, offering to mediate in an effort to
trigger negotiations. The parties agreed to sit down and talk on the weekend of 11–12
April but this first effort failed due to one careless remark to the media by Prime Minis-
ter The ´o Lefe `vre: ‘J’espe `re que l’on ne devra pas appeler ce temps, le temps des
assassin’ [‘I hope we will not have to call this period, the time of assassins’].
88 When
this comment was passed on to all doctors by telephone, they threatened to abolish guard
duties at the hospital in retaliation.
89
In response, the government panicked, and drew up new military guidelines facilitat-
ing the conscription of doctors in order to bring the strike to a rapid end. The new orders
demanded that all doctors who were part of the Belgian military reserve had to report –
in uniform – to their respective commanding officers in order to be assigned for hospital
duty. Doctors who refused to report for duty were subject to severe fines. In response, the
five chambers advised the doctors being called up not to obey orders that were meant to
sabotage the strike.
90
The government’s desperate ploy marked a turning point in the strike. Although its
position had initially been accepted by a majority of the public and media, the national
government faced increasing criticism as the strike continued. At the same time, how-
ever, the pressure of the strike began to produce cracks within the leadership and among
the membership of organised medicine. In particular, there emerged a sharp conflict
about the objective of the strike. For some, the purpose was to achieve their objective
in ensuring that any health system reform did not change existing freedoms in terms of
billing. For others, the objective was to bring down the government itself.
These weaknesses pushed both sides back to the bargaining table with the four univer-
sity rectors the following weekend, 17–18 April, at the end of which the government
retreated on its position and the doctors agreed to end the strike.
91 Since the weekend set-
tlement met most of the doctors’ demands, it was interpreted as a victory for the cham-
bers and a major defeat for the government.
92 However, as in the case of Canada where
the opposite was perceived to have occurred, the long-term consequences were more
nuanced and less favourable to the perceived victors.
Conclusion and Consequences
The leaders of organised medicine in Canada and Belgium shared a very similar philo-
sophy. Both versions of medical liberalism defended the right of doctors to determine
the nature of their relationship with patients, especially their untrammelled right to set
their own fees, and attacked more collectivist philosophies that viewed healthcare as a
88Archive RTBF (the French speaking public
television station), documentary ‘Me ´decins en cole `re’
in the series Anne ´es belges, 31 March 1998.
89Speech of minister Piet Vermeylen, 12 April
1964, MGT 54771, nr. 4. VRT Radio-archive.
90Mots d’ordre of the strike committee of the SK
Lie `ge-Luxembourg, 13 Apr. 1964. Archive SK Lie `ge.
91De Standaard, 17 April 1964
92VRT Radio-archive, MGT 54817, nr. 3, 1964
April 18 and De Standaard, 20 April 1964.
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221public good and right of citizenship rather than a market service provided by physicians
to clients or consumers. Rooted in a nineteenth-century conception of the freedom to
contract and a limited state, the tenets of medical liberalism clashed with the more col-
lectivist philosophies propounded by social democratic, democratic (non-revolutionary)
socialist, and similar centre–left political movements in the twentieth century.
The 1960s marked the apex of the expansion of the welfare state in the advanced
industrial countries of the West, an expansion led by centre–left governing parties that
promoted universal access to medical services. While this trend was resisted by orga-
nised medicine in numerous countries, the most formidable resistance came in the
form of the lengthy and bitter doctors’ strikes in Canada and Belgium. These respective
strikes would mark both polities and shape the evolution of public healthcare in the
future by ensuring that doctors remained private, independent contractors with the state.
In both countries, fee-for-service remuneration remains the dominant system of payment
for physicians, and a semi-permanent obstacle to government-led reforms of primary
healthcare. These longer-term consequences seem to clash with more contemporary eva-
luations of the outcomes of the strike in both countries.
In Canada, the government was generally perceived to have won the strike. However,
in reality, organised medicine was able to improve the economic position of its members
even while it preserved the contractual system of remuneration and private practice, pro-
tected the role of physicians at the centre of the healthcare system, and prevented major
changes to primary healthcare.
93 In a manner similar to the British Medical Association’s
ability to exploit divisions within successive British governments, the Canadian Medical
Association and its provincial chapters were effective in consolidating their gains and
preventing subsequent governments from initiating further reform, in part because of
the fear of another strike by physicians.
94
In Belgium, the doctors were perceived to have won the strike. In an important sense,
this was an accurate perception in that Belgian physicians, like their Canadian counter-
parts, preserved the contractual system of fee-for-service remuneration and private prac-
tice and protected the role of physicians as the central players in the Belgian health
system. In particular, organised medicine in Belgium had prevented a British-style
national health system from being erected. However, unlike the Canadian case, the doc-
tors were unable to prevent the Belgian government from placing controls on physician
remuneration in order to contain cost, and in this respect, could not supplant the contin-
ued supremacy of the social insurance funds.
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